The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 58 | Number 2

May 1991

Prolonging Life: A Traditional Interpretation
Kevin O'Rourke

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
O'Rourke, Kevin (1991) "Prolonging Life: A Traditional Interpretation," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 58: No. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol58/iss2/4

Article 4

Prolonging Life:
A Traditional Interpretation
Rev. Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., J.C.D., S.T.M.
The author, director of the Center for Health Care Ethics at St. Louis
University Medical Center, says that while writing this article, he benefitted
greatly from the assistance and insights offered by Sister Jean Katherine
de Blois, c.s.J., Ph. D., St. Louis University Medical School and Rev.
Charles Bouchard, 0. P. , Aquinas Institute of Theology, St. Louis.
In a recent article in this journal, I Professor William E. May of the
Catholic University of America characterized my interpretation of Catholic
Church teaching in regard to withholding and withdrawing life support as
"mistaken, mischievous, erroneous, dangerously misleading seriously
deficient". While this may not be apt language for debate within the
Catholic tradition, the article does provide an occasion to further the search
for truth. Seeking to fulfill this search in this article I shall explain briefly
the essence of the disagreement, examine some of Professor May's
assumptions , and demonstrate that the interpretation I present is in accord
with the interpretation of Church teaching offered by recent and ancient
authorities in medical ethics.

The Disagreement
Professor May states that the means to prolong life may be judged
ordinary or extraordinary (proportionate or disproportionate) insofar as
the means to prolong life do or do not impose a grave burden upon the
subject or are useful or useless. 2 While I agree in general with this statement,
in accord with the terminology utilized by the Bishops of the United States,J
I prefer to use the term ineffective rather than useless to designate therapy
which is extraordinary, that is , which is morally optional. The difference is
more than a choice of words . Webster defines useless as "having or being of
no use". Ineffective is defined "not producing an intended effect". A therapy
may be useful in the sense that it produces an effect but ineffective because
the effect produced was not intended . How this distinction applies to our
study will be discussed later in this article. 4 Professor May emphasizes that
medical treatment may be judged extraordinary or disproportionate and
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hence not morally obligatory only if "objectively discernible features in the
treatment itself . .. impose grave burdens on the person being treated or
others".5 Thus, he would not allow for consideration of the medical
(physical) condition of a patient which pre-exists the pathology to be
treated . He maintains that only the effects of the therapy may be
considered, without reference to the overall condition of the patient before
he or she contracted the illness for which therapy is being evaluated. His
motive for allowing only "objective features" to be used in the assessment of
extraordinary means is expressed as follows: "Too often the judgment that
a treatment is useless or excessively burdensome does not reflect serious
consideration of the objectively discernible features ofthe treatment, but an
expression of attitudes toward the life being treated". 6 On the other hand ,
the conviction of several others as well as myself,7 is that the teaching of the
Church allows and requires an analysis of subjective factors which pre-exist
the treatment, as well as objective factors , before a decision is made to
utilize, withhold , or withdraw life support. Hence, I would maintain that
subjective factors which pre-exist a fatal pathology and which are not
caused by the fatal pathology, may be evaluated when determining whether
the therapy to overcome or alleviate the pathology imposes a grave burden
or is ineffective. These subjective factors concern the overall condition of
the patient, not only the physiological function of the person, but also the
social and spiritual functions . To put it another way, the health status of a
person which pre-exists a fatal pathology, as well as the person's economic
status, may be considered when assessing whether a medical therapy is
burdensome or ineffective for a particular person.
The need to consider the subjective and pre-existing factors of the person
receiving treatment is evidenced, it seems, by the following statements of
Church teaching: "But normally one is held to use only ordinary means
- according to circumstances o/person. place. time. and culture - that is ,
means which do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. 8 How
can one consider "the circumstances" without considering the overall
condition of the person for whom therapy is contemplated? Another
statement of Church teaching maintains: "In any case, it will be possible to
make a correct judgment as to the means by studying the type of treatment
to be used , its degree of complexity, or risk, its cost and the possibility of
using it and comparing these elements with the result that can be expected,
taking into account the state o/the sick person and his or her physical and
moral resources. " 'I How is it possible to consider the "state ofthe sick person
and his or her resources" if one doesn't consider the condition of the person
which pre-exists the pathology?
The fittingness of considering the subjective factors which pre-exist the
pathology when making ethical decisions concerning life support was also
affirmed by the Papal Council Cor Unum. When commenting upon the
document of the Church, On Euthanasia. the Papal Council stated:
The criteria whereby we can distinguish ex traordina ry measures fr om ordinary
measures are very many . They are a pplied according to each concrete case. Some
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of them are objective: such as the nature of the measures proposed , how expensive
they are, whether it is just to use them , and what the options of justice are in the
matter of using them . Other criteria are subjective such as not giving certain
patients psychological shocks, anxiety uneasiness and so on. It will always be a
question , when deciding upon measures to be taken , of establishing to what extent
the means to be used and the end being sought are proportionate.
Among all the criteria f or decision. particular importance must be given to the
quality of life to be saved or k ept living by the therapy. 10 (emphasis added)

This latter statement clearly allows for consideration of conditions preexisting a pathology and the application of means to resist it. While the
statement of a Papal Council does not have the same authority as papal
teaching, it usually expresses aptly the tradition of the Church. In sum,
Church teaching seems to encourage the consideration of subjective factors
which pre-exist a fatal pathology when evaluating the moral obligation to
use or withhold a particular therapy.

The Purpose of Life
When assessing the ethical imperative to treat a fatal pathology, I assess
the grave burden imposed by the therapy, as well as the ineffectiveness. But
I consider these as proximate norms for assessing the therapy. Grave
burden and ineffective therapy must have a more basic norm for evaluation.
Thus, my interpretation of Catholic teaching is based upon the realization
that any effort to prolong one's own life or the life of another must be
evaluated in regard to the ultimate purpose of human life. Professor May
objects to this interpretation. I I Certainly there are many worthwhile
proximate goals in life. Health is one of them. But the pursuit of health
should be directed to the ultimate goal of life. Prolonging life is not the
ultimate nor absolute goal of life. 12 If it were, there would be a moral
obligation to prolong human life under all circumstances. If human life
were an absolute good , all discussion of proportionate and disproportionate means would be nugatory . In Catholic teaching, the goal of human
life is eternal life. 13 In order to strive for eternal life, we must perform human
acts, (acts of intellect and will) under the influence of charity. Acts of man
(vegetative and animal acts) of themselves do not bespeak the power to
strive for the goal of human life. 14 Hence, if medical therapy will not restore
a person to a condition where human acts can be performed by the person,
then that therapy would be ineffective or extraordinary. If the therapy
would restore or maintain a person to a condition in which the person could
strive for the purpose oflife only with excess burden, then it is extraordinary
from a moral point of view. To see this point more clearly, let us consider
the terms "proportionate" and "disproportionate", which have been
recommended in place of the terms "ordinary and extraordinary" . 15
Something cannot be judged "proportionate" or "disproportionate" unless
in relation to a goal. When evaluating, (whether for oneself or for another) ,
whether or not the means to prolong life will be proportionate or
disproportionate there must be some goal in mind. Is that goal merely
14
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prolonging human life or is it prolonging life in order to attain eternal life?
While prolonging human life more often than not contributes to striving for
the purpose of life, there are some situations where this is not verified. When
a goal is said to be proportionate or disproportionate then, the goal by
which it is evaluated seems to be the ability to strive for eternal life.
Statements from papal teaching seem to confirm the need to refer the
moral evaluation of life support to our ultimate goal in life. Pius XII, for
example, stated: "Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact
subordinated to spiritual ends." The Document on Euthanasia stated:
"Everyone has the duty to lead his or her life in accord with God's plan. That
life is entrusted to the individual as a good that must bear fruit here on
earth, but that finds its full perfection only in eternal life." The Pontifical
Council Cor Unum is even more specific in regard to the relationship
between prolonging life and the purpose of life: "Life is a gift bestowed in
order for men and women to accomplish a mission ... (this mission)
involves duty to care for the body, its functions, its organs; ... to do
everything one can to render oneself capable of attaining to God. This duty
sometimes requires that we sacrifice health and life; our concern for them
cannot allow us to deny the claim of superior values." The term "mission in
life" used by the Pontifical Council seems to express quite adequately the
idea I have expressed in the words "purpose of life".
When discussing whether means to prolong life are ordinary or
extraordinary, usually the discussion centers around the practice of
medicine. The need to consider subjective factors pre-existing the onset of
disease before recommending therapy is a consistent practice in medicine. 16
While we shall examine explicitly the purpose of medicine later in the
article,17 for now it suffices to realize that physicians always consider the
overall condition of their patient before recommending therapy. In clinical
situations, simply prolonging the life of a person is not the goal of medicine;
persons with advanced Alzheimer's disease are not considered as apt
recipients for heart transplants, even if they are otherwise in excellent
physical condition. It would be inconsistent for the teaching ofthe Catholic
Church in regard to prolonging life to be at odds with the ethical practice of
medicine.
Competent and Incompetent Persons
Insofar as competent patients are concerned , that is, patients who are
capable of making their own medical decisions, Professor May seems to
have little difficulty allowing for the consideration of subjective or preexisting factors; that is for factors (whether physiological, intellectual,
social, or psychological) which pre-exist the onset of a pathology for which
therapy must be evaluated ethically. He affirms: "Co mpetent persons have
the right to refuse any "extraordinary" treatment, i.e., any treatment which
is useless and burdensome."J 8 But in deciding that a treatment is useless or a
burden, competent persons consider many subjective and pre-existing
May, 1991
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factors. For example, what I decide in regard to suitable therapy will
certainly depend upon my overall condition. If I am prolonging life through
use of a ventilator, do I want to begin dialysis to overcome kidney failure?
What will be my ability to function with and without the proposed
treatment? Do I wish to devote my savings to treatment or to the welfare of
my family? If the treatment is successful, will a pre-existing financial or
nursing burden for my family be prolonged indefinitely?
Professor May's problem with my interpretation seems to concern
incompetent patients, that is, those patients who cannot make health care
decisions for themselves . Therefore, the remainder of the article will
consider decision-making for incompetent patients. Professor May
expresses his concern for incompetent patients in the following passage:
What is my problem with O'Rourke's interpretation? .. 1 think that O'Rourke
errs gravely when he claims that a means is ineffective ... in helping a person strive
for the spiritual purpose of life and that a means is ordinary precisely because it
enables a person to strive for the spiritual purpose of life. Why do I think that
O'Rourke errs here? Many people, including some seriously handicapped children
and some elderly who are not 'with it' persons who are not actualy able to judge the
truth or falsity of propositions or make free choices, are not capable of striving for
the 'spiritual purpose' oflife. They cannot do so because in order to do so, a person
must be able to make judgments and to make free choices. But those unfortunate
human beings are still persons and it is good for them to be alive .. . My problem is
that if this (O'Rourke's opinion) is correct, that the lives of countless severely
handicapped persons , including infants and the elderly, are regarded as worthless.
There are many such persons who are no longer capable or will never be capable of
reaching life's spiritual goals ... But I submit they are still beings of moral worth,
i.e., persons whose lives are irreplaceably precious and worthy of our respect and
love. "

Capacity to Perform Human Acts
I have quoted at length from Professor May's article because it
demonstrates some erroneous assumptions which confuse the ethical
assessment of life support. The first assumption is: That a person who is
incapable of making medical decisions is incapable of performing human
acts. A human act requires deliberation and choice (intellect and will), but
there are various levels of human deliberation and choice and thus various
capacities to perform human acts. A person who is incapable of making
medical decisions for herself may still make choices about other aspects of
her life. An apt analogy arises from the ability to make financial decisions.
Simply because a person has a guardian appointed for financial affairs does
not imply that the person is incapable of performing human acts, especially
in regard to spiritual goods. Making medical decisions usually involves
understanding various options for treatment, the cost involved, the
alternative to treatment, the possibility of success, and the expected
function of the person if the treatment is successful or if the treatment is not
utilized. One could be morally and legally incompetent to make medical
decisions and still be striving for the purpose of life. By the term "not with
it", presumably Professor May refers to people who suffer from dementia
16
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or senility. He seems to imply that dementia or senility are univocal clinical
diagnoses . They are not; there are several stages of dementia and senility
just as there are several stages of Alzheimer's disease. The most significant
clinical symptom of these illnesses is that they are irreversible; they do not
deprive a person of the ability to perform human acts at all stages of the
illness.
In asserting that people who are senile or who have Alzheimer's disease
may still be able to perform human acts, I am not maintaining that they
should be kept alive at all costs. As we shall see, senility or Alzheimer's
disease may be pre-existing, subjective factors which are factored into the
decision concerning treatment for a fatal pathology and whether the means
to treat the pathology are proportionate or disproportionate. But to assert
that the interpretation of Church teaching which allows for consideration
of pre-existing subjective factors leads to neglect and death for seriously
handicapped children and elderly people is an extrapolation with no basis
in clinical medicine nor in ethical reasoning.
There is one clinical condition however, which is incompatible with
human acts. People in a medically diagnosed persistent vegetative state
(PVS) suffer from a dysfunctional cerebral cortex and thus are unable to
perform the bodily acts which dispose for acts of the intellect and will, that
is, acts of cognitive affective function .20 In recent years, especially when
commenting upon the Paul Brophy and Nancy Beth Cruzan cases, I have
stated that because persons in PVS are unable to perform human acts, there
is no moral obligation to keep them alive. While they are still persons, they
do not benefit from life support.21 Moreover, patients in PVS have a fatal
pathology. Because their cerebral cortex is dysfunctional, they are unable to
perform the conscious acts of chewing and swallowing. 22 The pathology
which hinders chewing and swallowing can be circumvented by artificial
hydration and nutrition. But if the pathology is circumvented by artificial
hydration and nutrition, the person will not regain the ability to perform
human acts which are necessary in order to strive for the purpose of life.
Just as a person with a dysfunctional cerebral cortex cannot perform the
conscious actions necessary to strive for the purpose of life, so they cannot
feel pain. 23 There is no moral obligation to prolong the lives of people in this
condition through care or through therapy. Hence there is no obligation to
circumvent the pathology affecting their ability to chew and swallow.
Allowing the pathology to take its natural course does not bring on
"starvation and dehydration." Some people, especially when writing Letters
to the Editor, declare that Nancy Beth Cruzan was "starved to death ." This
language brings to mind the vision of a conscious and competent patient
being deprived of nourishment which would benefit her. But people in a
persistent vegetative state can no longer feel pain, can no longer chew or
swallow, and can no longer strive for the purpose of life. Moreover, when a
respirator or artificial hydration and nutrition are removed from a patient
who will not benefit from such therapy the intention of the agent is the
desire to stop ineffective therapy; not to kill the patient. The cause of death
May, 1991

17

is the underlying pathology.
Professor May and several co-authors believe that medical therapy is not
burdensome or ineffective if it merely prolongs physiological function of
persons in PVS and does nothing to restore their social and spiritual
functions. They maintain that life in this condition is a "great benefit. "24
Most medical professionals and "lay people" do not seem to agree. Over the
past five years, I have asked thousands of people: "If you were in a persistent
vegetative state, would you want your life prolonged by means of artificial
hydration and nutrition," No one has ever said "yes." While this
overwhelming reaction may not be a theological proof, it is an insight that
cannot be ignored. Moreover, it makes us question iflife in this condition is
a "great benefit".
Finally, the clinical practice of medicine supports the ethical reasoning
which allows for removal oflife support from patients who will not recover
cognitive-affective function. Few physicians would state that it is their
responsibility to prolong physiological function if it does not enable the
patient to function at the cognitive-affective level. If physicians treat people
in a comatose condition, it is with the hope of restoring some degree of
cognitive-effective function. 25 That medicine has more in mind than mere
physiological function is affirmed by contemporary authorities in the field.
Leon Kass describes the purpose of medicine in this way: "Healing is thus
the central care of medicine: to heal the whole is the doctor's primary
business . . . that wholeness means a certain well-working of the enlivened
body and its unimpaired powers to sense, think, feel, desire, move, and
maintain itself . ... "26
Pellegrino and Thomasma offer the following definition of medicine:
"We have defined the end goal of medicine as a right and good healing
action for a particular patient .. . The aim of medicine is to address not only
the bodily assault that disease or an injury inflicts but also the
psychological, social, even spiritual dimensions of this assault. To health is
to make whole or sound, to help a person reconvene the powers of self and
return, as far as possible to his conception of a normallife."27
Quality of Life
The second assumption underlying Professor May's opInion is that
removing life support should not be based upon "quality oflife" decisions. 28
Others seeking to apply the Catholic tradition to cases concerning the
removal of life support maintain this position even more strongly. 29 The
main difficulty in regard to this assumption is that Professor May and
others use the term quality of life as though it were a univocal term having
only one meaning. This leads Professor May to confuse the norms for care
of disabled people with care of those who will not benefit from therapy.
Actually, quality oflife is an analogous term and has at least three different
meanings. 30 All three meanings of the term imply that a person suffers from
impaired human function . But the circumstances of the persons with
18
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impaired functions differ considerably. In one sense of the term persons
with genetic or acquired disabilities are said to have a "diminished quality of
life" because they cannot perform actions in a "normal" manner. Even
though these persons have physical or mental disabilities they are not
necessarily suffering from a fatal pathology. The term quality of life is also
used to refer to people who have impaired function precisely because they
are suffering from a fatal pathology. Thus , someone with cancer of the
brain would not function in a normal manner, and would have a diminished
quality of life, precisely because of the pa~hology from which he or she
suffers. Thirdly, quality oflife is used when referring to people who have less
than normal function , who also have a fatal pathology, but whose impaired
function is not the result of the fatal pathology. Thus, an infant with Down
Syndrome (impaired function), may also suffer from duodenal atresia (fatal
pathology).
The decision to withhold or withdraw life support differs for people in the
three different categories. Concerning persons in the first category; that is ,
those who are impaired but have no fatal pathology, there is no ethical or
medical basis for making a decision to withhold the care which enables
them to continue living. The decision to withhold or withdraw life support
is only made when a fatal pathology is present. To withhold life support
from people without a fatal pathology would be the same as intending their
death. Intending (causing in the proper sense of the term) the death of
another is always contrary to Catholic teaching. )1 Thus, when a disabled
person has sufficient homeostasis to support life, that person is not a
candidate for decisions concerning ordinary and extraordinary means to
prolong life. History recounts that in so me societies the cause of death was
induced in persons with a low quality of life. Clearly, putting persons to
death simply because they had impaired function was a heinous crime. Even
if defended on the grounds that it eliminated the suffering of people with
"diminished quality oflife," it constituted euthanasia. But it is irresponsible
to equate every act of withholding life support from people with impaired
function with euthanasia, whether active or passive. And it is equally
irresponsible to suggest that removing life support from people with a
diminished quality of life (i.e., impaired function) who suffer from a fatal
pathology always implies the intention of causing their death. In the face of
impaired function and fatal pathology, people often experience the limits of
medicine and remove life support because they intend to remove a burden
from the patient or realize their efforts to help the patient are no longer
beneficial.
For people in the second and third categories, quality oflife must often be
considered when ethically assessing the use of life prolonging therapy. For
example, Mom has a brain tumor. Because of the tumor, her cognitive and
affective functions are severely impaired. She fits into the second category
of people with a diminished quality of life. Her impaired cognitive-affective
function is the direct result of her illness. Mom's kidneys start to fail.
Clearly, Mom's life could be prolonged for at least a few months through
May, 1991
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dialysis. But would the added time of life enable Mom to better fulfill her
mission in life? It seems that Mom's pre-existing subjective condition
(impaired cognitive-affective function) would justify ethically the decision
to forego renal dialysis and thus allowing Mom to die of end stage renal
failure. Even though we would foresee Mom's death, we would not intend
Mom's death. Rather, we would be admitting our limits to help her strive
for the spiritual purpose of life in the face of fatal pathology.
People in the third category, that is, those who have impaired function
and a fatal pathology, but whose impaired function is not the result of the
fatal pathology, offer the most difficult ethical decisions. In these cases, we
must attempt to discern whether circumventing or alleviating the pathology
will enable them to strive for the spiritual purpose of life. Many infants born
with genetic anomalies are in this category. For example, an infant suffers
from severe neurological impairment and also has impaired pulmonary
function. The pulmonary pathology could be circumvented. It is necessary
to circumvent the pulmonary pathology by means of a respirator and thus
prolong the infant's life. Applying the ethical norms of "grave burden" and
"ineffective" therapy to infants with a diminished quality of life is more
difficult than applying it to other persons. The prognosis for infants is
always tinged with uncertainty and that makes decisions of this nature more
difficult. Every neonatal care physician or nurse can cite a case when an
infant survived and thrived, contrary to professional expectations.
Moreover, when jUdging the future well-being of a disabled infant, we must
not underestimate the value of human life. Adults born with genetic or
acquired anomalies are vociferous in appealing for life support for
debilitated infants.
Clearly, unethical decisions have been made in regard to infants who
have a diminished quality of life and a fatal pathology. The Baby Doe case
in Indiana is a good example. 32 Baby Doe was a child born with Down
Syndrome and duodenal atresia. Unless simple surgery were performed to
correct the atresia, he would be unable to digest food and would thus die in a
few days. Because Baby Doe had a diminished quality of life, he was
allowed to die from the duodenal atresia. Would the therapy have been
burdensome? No; it is performed routinely on normal infants. Would this
therapy have been effective, that is, would the therapy have allowed Baby
Doe to strive for the purpose of life? Yes , indeed; retarded children are able
to perform human acts and do strive for a spiritual purpose in life. Even
though Baby Doe died because of a pathology present in his body , not
because of an induced pathology, there was no ethical ground for
withholding surgery. Thus, he was a victim of passive euthanasia.
From the foregoing discussion of "quality of life", two observations
emerge:
I) Quality of life is an analogous term; it is used to refer to people in
many different conditions. The term should not be used as a weapon, as it
often is , to imply that every decision to withhold and remove life support is
an act of active or passive euthanasia.
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2) As the Papal Council Cor Unum and other authorities indicate, 33the
term quality oflife is an acceptable term when referring to subjective factors
which will influence decisions concerning life support. But because of the
emotional response to the term, rather than use the term "quality of life"
when discussing ethical decisions concerning withholding or withdrawing
life support, the term quality offunction seems more fitting because it is less
inflammatory and more descriptive. 34 Assessing the quality of function in
relation to striving for the purpose of life becomes important when making
an ethical analysis concerning life support.
Imminent Death

A third assumption underlying Professor May's thinking is the
conviction that life support may never be removed from incompetent
patients unless death is imminent; and death is never considered imminent if
human life can be prolonged through life support. Thus, unless the life
support fails, or functions improperly, so that it imposes a grave
physiological burden upon the patient, the life support may not be removed
from incompetent patients. To put it another way, Professor May would
hold that life support must be utilized as long as it will prolong life for an
incompetent person. The cognitive-affective function of the person is
irrelevant iflife can be prolonged. Professor May does not refer explicitly to
this assumption in his recent article, but it serves as a basis for his thought in
another article co-authored with a spectrum of theologians. 35 Often the
same thought is expressed in the words: "The patient is not dying, therefore
life support cannot be removed." However, Catholic tradition has never
limited the removal oflife support to situations in which the patient is dying.
Rather, Catholic tradition allows the questions of burden and effectiveness
to be asked when a fatal pathology is present, whether death is imminent or
not. 36
The assumption that life support may be removed only if death is
imminent seems to be derived from a popular legal interpretation of the
term "terminal illness". The interpretation in question results principally
from laws and prevalent court decisions but people in non-legal professions
often accept the interpretation. In the Cruzan case for example, the
Missouri Supreme Court offered as one argument for continuing artificial
hydration and nutrition for Nancy Beth Cruzan, the statement "that Nancy
was not in a terminal condition," meaning, that she would not die in the
foreseeable future because the life support circumventing her fatal
pathology would continue to prolong her life.J7 The Missouri Court used
the legal definition of terminal illness usually contained in its Living Will
Legislation. Thus terminal illness was considered an illness which would
lead to death in the immediate future even iflife support had been applied .
According to this interpretation, if life support has been applied and is
successful, the patient's death is no longer imminent. Thus the illness in
question is not considered a terminal illness. This mode of thinking leads
May, 1991
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some physicians, often fearing legal liability, to continue life support long
after it is beneficial for the overall well-being of the patient. It also leads
several anti-euthanasia activists to protest the death of any person, no
matter what the quality of function, who could be kept alive.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently clarified this misunderstanding by redefining the meaning of "terminal illness" at least
insofar as the State of Illinois is concerned. In the Greenspan case (1990),
the Court pointed out that the usual legal interpretation of terminal illness
leads to a vicious circle, renders living wills meaningless and makes it
impossible for compassionate care for people unable to benefit from
therapy. The Court declared: "If the very delay caused by the procedures
were allowed to govern the assessment of imminence, the (Living Will) Act's
definition of a terminal illness would be rendered circular and meaningless.
Imminence must bejudged as iJthe death delaying procedures were absent.
The implication of this statement is found in the Court's statement: "With
feeding tubes, patients have been known to live for years in a chronic
vegetative state; such a fact is irrelevant. "38 (emphasis added)
This interpretation of terminal illness and imminent death which calls for
an evaluation of the illness "as if the death delaying procedures were
absent", is more in accord with the teaching of the Church. In Catholic
teaching, the "imminence" of death is not per se a requisite for the ethical
decision to remove life support. A person could refuse surgery to remove a
serious cancer, and still live a long time after the cancer has been diagnosed.
Surely, the imminence of death may be utilized as one of the factors in
determining whether therapy is an excessive burden or ineffective; that is,
whether therapy will affect one's ability to strive for the purpose of life.
However, the ethical decision to withhold or withdraw life support might be
made even if death is not imminent.39 In the Catholic tradition, removal of
life support does not hinge upon a determination that a person is dying or
that death is imminent. Rather, the central issue in this tradition is whether
or not the therapy needed to overcome or alleviate the fatal pathology will
impose a grave burden or will be ineffective, subjective and pre-existing
factors being considered. Or to put it another way: Will prolonging life
benefit the patient insofar as the spiritual purpose of life is concerned?
The conviction that life must be prolonged at all costs, and that the only
way we can show our respect for human life and our love for others is to
prolong life, no matter how impaired their capacity to function , seems a bit
out place when compared to Catholic teaching in regard to death and
resurrection. One contemporary author maintains the emphasis upon
keeping people alive at all costs is a sign of the secularization of Catholicism
in the United States. 40 According to Catholic faith, death is not the end of
existence and our life on earth is the beginning of eternal life. As Rahner put
it: " Man cannot understand his present in any other way except as the
beginning and the coming to be of a future and in the dynamism toward it.
Man understands his present only insofar as he understands it as the
approach toward and the opening up of a future."41 Suffering and death,
22
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which no one can avoid in this life are realities which can be transformed
into the fullness of human life. Hence, allowing a person to die when
continued therapy is no longer beneficial is not abandonment, nor does it
bespeak a lack of respect and love, which Professor May seems to suggest.
Our efforts as Christians, it seems, should be directed toward accepting
death and demonstrating our hope in God's gift of eternal life; not by trying
to force every last second out of human life. The emphasis upon prolonging
life at all costs seems to consider the "good" of human life as something
apart from the person who is living it. Professor May's insistence that "life is
never a burden" seems also to separate the "good of human life" from the
way people experience their lives. When he says "life is never a burden", he
wishes to prove that suicide and euthanasia are never justified. This is
accepted Catholic teaching. But the basis for this teaching is the nature of a
person's relationship to God the Creator, not the thought that "life is never a
burden" or that "life is a good of and for the person."42
Authors in Agreement

The opinion which directs analysis of medical means to the spiritual
purpose of life and which maintains that the pre-existing, subjective
conditions affecting the function of the patient may be considered when
determining whether or not life support should be utilized is not innovative
or radical, as Professor May implies. For example, Gerald Kelly, writing in
1958, declared: "As I said many physicians believe that a more moderate
standard may be followed ... They try to preserve life as long as the patient
himself can reap any tangible benefits from the prolongation. But they also
think there is a point when such efforts become futile gestures . .. The
moderate standard . .. seems to be very much in accord with the traditional
policy of Catholic theologians of interpreting obligations according to a
reasonable limit . . . Finally, it seems evident that the moderate standard is
less likely to impose the excessive burdens on the patient's relatives.
Relatives often endure terrific strains and undergo great expense while life is
being prolonged by artificial means, and in some cases, the terminal coma;
little good seems to be accomplished."43
Thomas O'Donnell, S.l. in 1976 stated that commonly available
techniques of modern surgery and medicine should usually be utilized. But
he adds : "These techniques need not be utilized in some circumstances. The
relation of their use to the remaining potentiality of what we have called the
'fundamental context of human life' should be the basis of the moral
judgment as to whether such modern means must be used or not."44
O'Donnell's "fundamental context of human life" is similar to the spiritual
purpose of life.45
Finally, Francis deVittoria, writing in the 16th century, describes a
pre-existing psychological condition which determines whether or not a
person must use food to avoid death. He stated: "If a sick man can take food
with a certain hope of life, he is held to take the food . But if his spirits are
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depressed and his appetitive powers are so disturbed that eating food
becomes a torture, it would be considered an impossibility for the man to
take food. Hence, he would be excused, at least from mortal sin, especially
where there is little hope of prolonging life.46
Conclusion

Certainly, one may follow the opinion that life must be prolonged as long
as possible, apply the terms "grave burden" and "useless" without referring
them to the spiritual goal of life, and demand that life support never be
removed unless the patient is "terminal" and still be within the Catholic
tradition. But a more extensive interpretation of Catholic teaching is also
consistent with the Catholic tradition and does not seem to be "erroneous,
mischievous, dangerously mistaken, nor seriously deficient." Rather it
seems to be in accord with the Church teaching, and is traditional in the
sense that it has been accepted through the years in clinical situations by
families, physicians and theologians. It seems, therefore, an acceptable and
workable interpretation of the Catholic tradition would:
I) consider the pre-existing subjective conditions of the person when
discerning whether therapy to overcome or alleviate a fatal pathology
imposes a grave burden or is ineffective;
2) use the spiritual purpose of life to assess grave burden and ineffective
therapy;
3) allow the withdrawal of life support even if life could be prolonged,
provided there is a grave burden which would impede pursuing one's
mission in life or provided the therapy is ineffective insofar as helping a
person strive for the spiritual purpose of life.
References
I. May, William E., "Criteria for Withholding or Withdrawing Treatment," Linacre
Quarterly, August, 1990; 57:3, p. 81-90.
2. Op cit. p. 82; John Connery, states that: "Originally, the distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means to prolong life was based only on grave burden, experienced
before, during or after the treatment." Medical means which were useless were not
considered mandatory because of the general realization that useless actions are not required
morally. (Summa Theo logicae, II-II , Q.6 a.3) But useless means were not called
extraordinary. "Today, most theologians subsume the distinction between useful / useless
means under the definition of ordinary / extraordinary means. Connery warns combining the
two terms can cause confusion. "Prolonging life: The Duty and its Limits," Catholic Mind,
October 1980, p. 42.
3. "Every patient should be provided with measures which can effectively preserve life
without involving too grave a burden." National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "The
Rights of the Terminally III," Origins, 16: 12, pp. 222-224.
4. p. 12; p. 16 of this text;
5. Op. cit., p. 88.
6. Op. cit., p. 82.
7. McCormick , Richard, "To Save or Let Die, The Dilemma of Modern Medicine,
Journal o/the American Medical Association 229 (1974) pp. 172-176. Thomas Schindler,
"Implications of Prolonging Life," Health Progress (April, 1988), 12. Dennis Brodeur,

24

Linacre Quarterly

"Bishops' Response to Act on Rights of Terminally Ill ," Health Progress. (January, 1987), p.
22ff. Cf. also authors cited in footnotes 36, 37, 38.
8. Pius , XII, Pope, "The Prolongation of Life," (Nov. 24, 1957) The Pope Speaks 4:4
(1958), p. 395.
9. Congregation of the Faith, "Declaration o n Euthanasia," (May 5, 1980) Origins
10: 10, p. 154.
10. Pontifical Council Cor Unum. "Questions of Ethics Regarding the Fatally III and the
D ying", Vatican Press, 1981.
II. Op. cit .. p. 86; On the other hand , Gerald Kelly, S.J. used the "s piritual benefit"
resulting from therapy as a co nsistent norm in his writings. "The Duty Using Artificial
Means of Preserving Life," Theological Studies (June, 1950), p. 219.
12. " Declaration on Euthanasia".
13. Ibid.
14. Summa Theologicae I-II , Q I, ;a.1.
15. "Declaration on Euthanasia".
16. Pellegrino, Edmund & David Thomas ma , For the Patient's Good. The Restoration
of Beneficence in Health Care. New York: Oxfo rd University Press, 1988, pp . 80-83;
170-171.
17. Cf. page 13 of this text.
18. Op. cit .. p. 82.
19. Op. cit .. p. 86.
20. The intellect and will are faculties of the soul. But in the huma n co nditi o n, soul a nd
body are so united (an unum per se) that the soul needs a functioning body in order to
actualize the intellect and will. The part of the body which must fun ctio n in o rd er for the
soul / bod y entity to perform human acts is the cerebral cortex . (Cf. Summa Theologicae. I.
q. 75, a. 2; I, a. 84, a. 6, 7).
21. Boyle, Philip, Larry King, M. D. and Kevin O'Rourke, "The Brop hy Case: The Use of
Artificial Hydration and N utritio n," Linam' Quarterlv. May, 1987, 54:2, pp . 63-71.
Kevi n O'Rourke, "S ho uld Nutrition a nd H yd rat ion Be Provided to Permanently
Unconscious a nd Other Mentally Disabled Persons," Issues in Law and Medicine. 5:2,
( 1989) pp . 183-196.
22. " Positi o n of the American Academy of Neu ro logy o n Certain Aspects of Persistent
Vegetative State Patients," Neurology 39: 125 (1989) p. 126.
23 . Op. cit .. Neuro logy. 1989. Allowing anencephalic infants to die, without life su pport,
has lo ng been co nsi dered a n ethical practice. Their condi tio n is si milar to patients in PV S.
24. William E. May , et al. "Feeding a nd Hydra ting the Permanently Unconscio us and
Other Vulnerable People," Issues in Law and Medicine 3:3 (1987) p. 209.
25. Op. cit .. Neurology. 1989; Cf. L. H. Schneiderman , N.S. J ecker. A. R. J onsen ,
" Medical Futility: Its M ea ning and Ethical Implica tio ns," Annals of Int ernal Medicine.
112: 12 (June 15, 1990) pp . 949-953. "In keeping with the qualitative notio n offutility, we
propose that any treatment that merely preserves permanent unco nsc io usness or that fails to
end total depe ndence on intensive medical care should be regarded as no n-beneficia l and
therefore futile." (p. 952)
26. Kass , Leon, "Neither for Love nor Money; Why D octors Must Not Kill," Public
Interest. Winter, 1989, p. 25.
27. Op. cit .. p. 10.
28. Op. cit .. p. 88.
29. New Jersey State Catholic Conference, "Providing Food a nd Fluids to Severely Bra in
Damaged Patient," Origins. 16:32 (Jan. 22, 1987) p. 582.
J a mes McHugh, "Artificially Assisted Nutrition and Hydratio n," Origins 19: 19 (Oct. 12,
1989)p.3 14.
30. Walters, James, a nd Thomas Shan nan , eds. Quality of Life: The Nell ' Medical
Dilemma. (New York: Pa ulist P ress, 1990), p. 78ff.
31. On Euthanasia. op. cit.

May, 1991

25

32. "Court Upholds Parents' Wish to Let Retarded Newborn Die," Chicago Tribune.
(Friday, April 16, 1982).
33. Cf. Connery, op. cit .. p. 51.
Germain Grisez, "A Christian Ethics of Limiting Medical Treatment," Bioethicallssues.
Pope John Paul Bioethics Center, Cromwell, Cf. (1986) p. 42; "In this sense, quality of life
considerations are unavoidable elements."
34. O'Donnell, T. J., unpublished paper on May et al. Cf. footnote #22.
35. Op. cit. May, et al.
36. Cf. Connery, op. cit.. p. 47. "Use of the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary means was not limited to terminal cases."
37. Supreme Court of Missouri, Nancy Beth Cruzan, by Co-guardians, Lester L. Cruzan,
Jr. and Joyce Cruzan v. Robert Harmon, No. 70813, (Nov. 16, 1988) Petition ofCertiorariin
the Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1988, p. A9; A26.
38. Illinois Supreme Court, "In Re: Estate of Sidney Greenspan v. Andrew Gelman,
Guardian ad litem. Docket N. 67903 (July 19, 1990) p. 15.
39. Connery, op. cit .. p. 47 and Pontifical Council Cor Unum. op. cit.
40. Bole, III , Thomas, "The Ordinary-Extraordinary Distinction Reconsidered: A Moral
Context for the Proper Calculus of Benefits, and Burdens," Hospital Ethics Committee
Forum. 2:4 (1990) p. 226.
41. Rahner, Karl, Foundations of Christian Faith. (New York: Crossroads, 1978), on
eschatology, p. 434.
42. Op. cit., p. 89.
43. Kelly, Gerald, Medico-Moral Problems. St. Louis: Catholic Hospital Association,
1958, p. 138.
44. O'Donnell, Thomas, Medicine and Christian Morality. (New York: Alba House,
1976), pp. 54-55, (2nd ed. 1991, pp. 57-58).
45. Private letter from Father O'Donnell to K. O'Rourke (Dec. 20, 1990). "To your
specific question, I agree that your consideration of the 'spiritual purpose oflife' is consistent
with my position on the 'fundamental context of human life' as expressed in Medicine and
Morality."
46. deVittoria, Francis, Relectio IX de temperautia, 1587; Cf. Relecciones Teologicas,
edition critica, Madrid, Imprenta La Rafa 1933-1935, Vol. III.

26

Linacre Quarterly

